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Abstract: 
 
 The main aim of this article is to analyse the theoretical background regarding monetary 
policy, money and capital markets with a reference to the Greek economy. 
 
From an international point of view the recent crisis has been affected by the incompleted 
financial market, problems of instability and political failure. The structure of Eurozone was 
another weak link in the establishment of an effective economic environment able to survive 
during the recent financial crisis however most of the concequences have affected the weak 
economies of the region. In fact the Hellenic economy with the structural inequilities in the 
labor, money and capital markets has been influenced hardly because the Greek government 
failed to take measures to manage the crisis.  
 
The Internationaal Financial Non-System with the trilemma problem in the design of a 
strong monetary policy can be attributed to the Hellenic crisis in a specific way as it is 
described in the article. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The present paper focuses on the political and economic reasons that lead to the 
Greek debt crisis in 2009 as well as the economic consequences for the Hellenic 
society and other member countries of the Eurozone. In general, the protected 
Hellenic economy, the lack of external disequilibrium and all kinds of debt issues 
evolved until the early 80s, all well-known to Greek governments long before 2009 
from official reports, along with the strong economic transformation from a 
“coordinated market economy” or “South European capitalism” to a “liberal market 
economy” in the period following lead to the debt crisis of 2009. European 
authorities in the name of Europe as an economic and monetary union imposed the 
“liberal market economy”, as yet incomplete. Hellenic politicians nevertheless have 
their share of responsibility. 
 
From an international economic point of view, the Hellenic debt crisis is found to be 
connected with, first, the institutional framework of the “de-regulation” of money 
and capital markets ending up to the crash of 2008 and the ensuing systemic-
economic crisis in particular in the incomplete Eurozone and, second, the Trilemma 
monetary policy or Mundell’s impossible trinity. More specifically, we distinguish 
between internal and external causes. Internal causes relate to bad domestic 
governance in the form of a lack of strategic planning for national economic 
development resulting in the severe pathology of generating a metapratic economy, 
gradually transformed from primary (agriculture, animal husbandry, fishing industry 
and mineral wealth) and much less secondary to mainly tertiary sector. As major 
external cause, we consider the lack of surplus recycling mechanism both 
internationally and within the non-optimal Eurozone.  
 
More specifically, in order to explain why a member country like Greece could not 
react against the “markets” we take into consideration the International Financial 
Non-System (IFnS), including the collapse of the Bretton Woods, the collapse of the 
“Global Minotaur” Varoufakis (2011), as well as the recent historically confirmed 
Trilemma. Our findings, policy lessons suggesting mechanisms to prevent the 
Hellenic debt crisis, indicate the responsibilities of the policy makers, although not 
sufficient for the non-recurrence of such crises (for small, open, integrated or to be 
integrated countries) as history shows. We question whether Hellenic economic 
events up to the Eurozone era comply with empirical verification of the Trilemma 
within the global and the EU framework lacking surplus recycling mechanism 
(Thalassinos et al., 2013a and 2013b, Thalassinos et al., 2012; Thalassinos et al., 
2015). The latter is evaluated on the basis of the theory of optimum currency areas, 
known as OCA. 
 
The main conclusion of our study is that the Hellenic debt crisis could have been 
forecast and thus prevented, suggesting that the Eurozone should change so as to 
become an OCA including fiscal federalism and European macro-governance 
promoting homogeneity, otherwise, its disintegration will emerge as a necessity. 
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Finally, based on policy implications of our conclusion we comment on recent EU 
institutional decisions in response to the Eurocrisis and the Hellenic crisis in 
particular, among others the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF – ESF as of 
2013) and the loan contracts including conditionality clauses demanded by the troika 
(EU, EC and IMF), known as Memorandum I (May, 2010 and Memorandum II 
(March, 2012). 
 
2. Approach 
 
2.1 The Methodology 
 
Our approach, limited to the period from post-Bretton Woods up to the Hellenic debt 
crisis of 2009 and adjusted to the regional (EU) and the international (“Global 
Minotaur”) institutional framework adopted (IfnS), includes critical research into 
whether the Hellenic economy is consistent with the Trilemma economic policy or 
not. If the Trilemma adjusted fits the data, events complying with the qualitative 
nature of our research, then the Hellenic debt crisis of 2009 should have been 
forecast and prevented.  
 
Our theory is based on two axes, first, given the lack of surplus recycling mechanism 
since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the institutional framework 
imposed on the small open Hellenic economy is crucial for the configuration of the 
Trilemma adopted by the authorities, because the IFnS and the incomplete EU define 
either the way “markets” function or how governments approach their goals, second, 
based on the international economics theory and focusing on “Mundell’s Trilemma 
economic policy or incompatible trinity”, we are able to highlight the limitations 
policy makers faced in their objectives and instruments prior to the 2009 debt crisis.  
 
Thereby, in open macroeconomics, policy makers are confronted with three typically 
desirable objectives, which are, (1) exchange rate stability (ERS), (2) monetary 
policy independence (MPI) towards domestic goals and (3) free capital movement or 
financial integration (FI). Given only two out of the three may be mutually 
consistent, transforming the third to instrument, the Trilemma for policymakers 
pertains to “which objective they have to give up, given the international payments 
system they have chosen or have to choose?”  
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
The Trilemma has been historically confirmed by Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor 
(2005, 2008, 2009) and Aizenman, Chinn and Ito (2008, 2010). The formulation of 
our research hypothesis was based on their influential works. 
 
2.1.1 Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2005, 2008, 2009) 
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In their work, OST ask the basic Trilemma question, “Do the exchange rate (ER) 
and capital controls (CC) regimes influence the extent to which local interest rates 
(Rit) diverge from the ‘world or base country’s’ rate?” Monetary Policy 
Independence (MPI) of the Trilemma is taken by the authors to mean the ability to 
drive local interest rates away from the world rate or base country’s rate. They 
conclude that “Exchange Rate Regimes (ERR) do affect Monetary Policy Activism 
(MPI), that is the extent to which a country follows the base, but capital controls 
(CC) of the Bretton Woods era, seemed to significantly slow or even stop those 
reactions.” Their research focused on three periods, (1), Gold Standard era: 1870-
1914, (2) Bretton Woods era: 1959-1970 and (3) Post-Bretton Woods era: 1973-
2000 and on three Exchange Rate Regimes (Pool, Pegs, Nonpegs) plus “pool with 
interactive term”. 
 
Their conclusions with regard to the eras researched are outlined as follows: 
 
(1) Within-era, the greater the Exchange Rate Stability (ERS) the lower the 
Monetary Policy Independence (MPI), given the Financial Integration (FI) chosen. 
 
(2) Across-era, the Trilemma trade-offs may be expressed and represented as 
follows:  
(i) Pegs and Free Capital Movement or Financial Integration (FI) objectives 
require the government to accept Monetary Policy Dependence (MPD) on the 
base’s country. This schema represents Eurozone (2002- ), a period when 
Pegs coincide with Euro (€) and MP Dependence with the European Central 
Bank’s (ECB) monetary policy. 
(ii) Non-Pegs and Free Capital Movement objectives allow reasonable 
Monetary Policy Independence (relative MPI). This schema represents 
Eurozone’s member countries during the 1990s, post-EU treaty (1992) up to 
the entrance of their currencies to the narrow bound of the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism II of the European Monetary System (1997 for the first set of the 
countries or 1998 for Greece).  
(iii) Either Pegs are rarely pure hand-cuffed (irrevocably ERS) or Non-Pegs 
are never purely freely floating (FER), that is often follow the base interest 
rate. In this schema definitions of Pegs and non-Pegs are not verified as rigid, 
thus making the other two more convincing and suitable.   
 
(3) Pooled-era, Exchange Rate Regimes (ERR) and Capital Controls (CC) clearly 
affect interest rate autonomy (MPI): 
(i) Floating Exchange Rates (FER) with Capital Controls (CC) seem to 
provide free monetary policy independence or autonomy (free MPI). This 
schema represents many countries after the collapse of the Bretton Woods. 
(ii) Non-Pegs with open markets (FI) and Pegs with closed Capital Controls 
(CC) retain some interest rate autonomy (relative MPI). This schema might 
represent Hellas if we accept the validity of (5)(iii) above in terms of Pegs 
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representing the Greek Drachmae (GRD) and capital controls in place until 
May 1194.  
(iii) Pegs with open markets (FI) have the least monetary policy autonomy 
(the least MPI). This schema may be seen as another version of (5)(i) above in 
the pooled-era. 
 
2.1.2 Aizenman, Chinn and Ito (2008, 2010) 
 
In their research, they came up with the following conclusions: 
 
(i) Trilemma policy goals are “binding” in the context of the impossible 
trinity. Any change in one of the Trilemma variables (ERS, MPI, FI) shall 
induce a change with the opposite sign in the weighted average of the other 
two. However, countries alter over time the weights of the Trilemma 
objectives.  
(ii) Structural breaks in the Trilemma indices have been proven to be 
associated with major economic events in the international financial non-
system (IFnS).  
(iii) Policy choices on Trilemma configuration surely affect macroeconomic 
performance of the countries. 
(iv) Trilemma configurations and domestic financial development or net 
external finance affect macroeconomic performance. 
(v) Trilemma configurations either affect more differently macroeconomic 
performance of “crisis economies’ than of tranquil ones or are changed after a 
“crisis”. 
 
2.3 Institutional framework 
 
2.3.1 European Union and Hellas: Links of Political Economy 
 
European Leaders undoubtedly promote the “economic” unification rather than any 
“political” unification or “sympolity”, as it has been suggested, accompanied by a 
“Constitutional Treaty” (Tsatsos, 2001). Over the years, though, Federalists and 
Eurosceptics unconsciously work for breaking down the Euro zone. 
 
2.3.2 European Economic and Monetary Union: Centrifugal Forces from Steady-
State Economic Equilibrium 
 
The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU henceforth) has been created 
under the Maastricht Treaty (1992) as a sui generis middle type of international 
economic integration, that is, between two theoretical types of “economic union” 
and “total economic union”. In this sense, the EU Treaty established the European 
System of Central Banks (European Central Bank – ECB) as a supranational 
authority for running monetary policy for the common currency, the Euro. ECB, 
unlike any other central bank in the world, operates above and beyond the reach of 
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any single national government under the mandate to pursue price stability, while the 
European Parliament has little power with regard to altering its statute. Furthermore, 
with regard to the incomplete fiscal policy harmonization in the EMU, governments 
of EMU-members are under rigid constraints in the exercise of their national fiscal 
powers, even in emergency states of sudden national recessions. 
 
The underlying economic theory is the Optimum Currency Areas (OCA). Although 
there is evidence in favor of the enhancement of financial integration as a result of 
the Euro, Europe’s product and factors markets have not sufficiently been unified 
yet. Given EMU is not yet optimal, as the respective OCA theory asks, it is well 
justified to assess economic policy choices and their consequences using the 
theoretical framework of Mundell’s incompatible trinity. The founders of the EMU, 
following the currency crisis of 1992-1993, gave up monetary policy to ESCB and 
preserved the Financial Integration (FI) and the Exchange Rate Stability (ERS) 
through the adoption of the Euro, as the Trilemma predicts. Practically, issues 
related to price stability and real economy was allocated to the ECB and the national 
governments respectively. Within this framework of ERS plus FI and the 
straitjackets of (1) the procedure of excessive deficits (PED), (2) the stability and 
growth pact (SGP) and (3) the peculiar ECB’s regulation without normal scope for 
central banks (e.g. “lender of last resort”), it is not to wonder about the rise of public 
debts in the Eurozone countries of 2000s, especially after the global crunch of 2008 
and the ensuing depression. 
 
In this regional framework, Hellas deprived itself of the luxury of exchange rate 
policy till 1998 as soon as it became a member of the EMU. Thus, as a small open 
economy characterized as badly governed, in the sense of not having made the 
necessary structural reforms within the Eurozone so as to restore its competitiveness, 
transformed the lenders’ willingness to invest into panic that lead to a liquidity crisis 
in the Hellenic banking sector. Furthermore, being an EMU member, its temporary 
liquidity problem could easily convert into a crisis, banking or sovereign given the 
Eurozone system lacks a mechanism of automatic stabilizer for equilibrating money 
and/or capital local markets. 
 
To the contrary, if outgoing euro-funds get out of Greek government bonds running 
to another EMU country-member as a safety shelter, then rising yields in Hellenic 
securities (forcing the country to bankrupt, if for instance markets “believe” that the 
sovereign debt is unsustainable), probably result in reduced yields of the safety 
shelter country-member. At the same time, increasing spreads may be the cause, 
through intensifying the Hellenic outflows, of a higher cost of Hellenic borrowing or 
lower cost to the safety shelter partners, or even more likely to both of them. The 
ECB managed to mitigate the deleveraging Hellenic pain only within the unofficial 
“quantitative easing” practice after 2008 global crunch by way of accepting Hellenic 
government bonds from banks as collateral to lend them Euro in order to prevent the 
banking crisis. This represents the obvious lack of chain links in the EMU system. 
Fiscal Federalism, as a first step towards fiscal union, could be an answer within the 
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framework of structural reforms in European integration architecture, aiming at total 
economic integration type, in the sense predicted by the OCA theory. 
Given the lack of control over the currency (Euro) an EMU-member’s debt has been 
issued, there is no way out, but bankruptcy for those that have been awarded the 
label of “insolvent” by markets. Hellas in particular has been obliged under two 
austerity plans to follow an internal devaluation hoping to reserve flows, thus 
leading the country’s debt transformation to foreign exchange and its downgrade. It 
will be no surprise if the economic crisis along with the social crisis and the austerity 
plans combined lead to a humanitarian crisis after all.  
 
2.3.3 International Financial Non-System in the post-Bretton Woods era: Global 
Minotaur and Bankruptocracy 
 
The allegory of the Global Minotaur characterizes the mechanism of surplus 
recycling developed in the post-Bretton Woods era: starting from the 1960’s, US 
merchandise trade changed into deficit along with the budgetary deficit. Upon the 
collapse of the Bretton-Woods system, US policy makers arranged for European, 
Asian and oil exporters’ surpluses, made mainly in the US output market, to return 
by almost 80% to Wall Street or US bonds, financing this way US twin deficits. At 
the same time, they also managed to restore US citizens’ purchasing power for 
foreign goods and services and thus retain their economic hegemony. 
 
The main factors, from a geopolitics point of view, that allowed the Global Minotaur 
to “attract” its food are the following:  
(i) The “exorbitant privilege” or the role of the USD as a global reserve 
currency that attracted incoming funds to Wall Street or FED bonds, thus 
boosting dollar exchange rates. 
(ii) The growing cost of energy that lead OPEC profits and European and 
Asian profits from innovations against the increase of energy cost to transfer 
them to Wall Street or FED bonds. 
(iii) The cheap and productive labor in the US compared to that of Europe and 
Asia. More specifically, the US managed to steadily decrease wages while at 
the same time doubling labor productivity, attracting foreign funds and firms 
to New York stock exchange. 
(iv) The geo-political power of the US undoubtedly played a great role in 
supporting the credibility of US dollar and capital markets. 
 
Other economic and political factors that permitted the growth of the Global 
Minotaur are the following: 
(i) Mergers and Acquisitions. More specifically, enormous flows from the rest 
of the world united with domestic corporate profits provoked a wave of 
mergers and acquisitions, thus financing the US twin deficits. 
(ii) The ideology of cheap in the age of excess: the Wal Mart phenomenon. 
The latter responded to decreasing purchasing power of lower incomes of 
Americans with reducing prices of its output. Wal Mart contributed to 
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reducing inflation, which in turn was necessary in order to maintain the 
Global Minotaur. 
(iii) Wall Street private-toxic money. Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) 
or securitized derivatives (SDs, eg. Credit Default Swaps – CDS) have been 
proven to be the smartest securities golden boys and girls constructed and sold 
in the derivatives market (Thalassinos 2014; Thalassinos et al., 2014). These 
sophisticated forms of indebtedness are considered “private” in the sense that 
they escape monetary authorities’ control and “toxic” in the sense that they 
distorted markets equilibrium. 
(iv) Toxic economic theories and supply-side economics. It has also been 
proven that neither theory of efficient market hypothesis can combine time 
and complexity at the same time, thus they cannot predict a crisis which by 
nature is a dynamic phenomenon. The deregulation caused by the President 
Clinton administration (i.e. the abolishment of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999) 
enabled commercial banks to invest depositors’ savings in risky Wall Street 
securities, creating that way private-toxic money that “burned” in the late 
2000’s, bringing to Hellas, amongst others, the ensuing economic crisis.  
 
Under these circumstances, excess supply in labor and financial markets is not 
settled by the decrease in prices, because firms are afraid that the current decline in 
wages reflects future reduced demand for their products. To that end, they decrease 
their demand on labor and bank loans even more. In cases of firms relying on bank 
loans, bankruptcy seems possible. Recession deepens as pro-cyclical is preferred 
over counter-cyclical policy implementation attributed to fear that comes from the 
lack of solvency for CDOs and goes on for banks that have mountains of these 
derivatives in their investment portfolio. Banks either cannot or are afraid of lending 
to businesses, thus transferring the liquidity problem of insolvent banks to healthy 
banks and the real economy after all. 
 
The “Global Minotaur” survived until 2009. Then it was “Bankruptocracy” that took 
over. More specifically, bail out of a crucial part of the private sector, for plausible 
general equilibrium economic reasons, would be made at the expense of taxpayers, 
who pay the rise in government debt. The more official sector’s bonds are sold in the 
capital markets, so as to finance failed management of banks, the more costly is the 
sovereign debt and the more austerity is imposed on citizens in order to save the 
necessary funds. The irony is that states borrow from “capital markets” (banks or 
financial institutions broadly speaking) at high interest rates, mainly because markets 
evaluate only the borrower and not its intention to rescue the general economic 
activity.  
 
After the 2008 global crunch, banks that bought government bonds also bought CDS 
for hedging purposes against respective bankruptcy risk. The more increase in a 
CDS’ price, the more increase in the respective yield of the bond and rise ultimately 
of spreads (yield’s difference between domestic and base countries’ bonds). The 
CDS market operations created a new era of private-toxic money just as the CDOs 
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did in the past. They both share one thing in common: the properties of money. 
“Zombie banks” are responsible for both banking and sovereign crises. As a crisis 
originated in a country can easily spread around the world through trade and factors’ 
movements, it is no surprise that as of 2008 we have been experiencing a global 
systemic crisis in progress. The public sector intervention for regulation purposes, in 
both international and regional level, is indispensable.   
 
Following the above, our research hypothesis is formatted as follows: The Hellenic 
government debt crisis of 2009 can be explained, given the bad domestic 
governance, either by the collapse of the international financial non-system in the 
crash of 2008, as well as, by the regional non-optimal EMU system, or by the 
historically confirmed Mundell’s Trilemma economic policies. 
 
3. Findings and Discussion: combination of Trilemma and Institutional 
Framework in the Hellenic case 1971-2009  
 
By combining the historically confirmed Trilemma economic policy with the 
institutional framework of surplus recycling mechanism (either the Eurozone in 
regional level or the Global Minotaur and later the Bankruptocracy in international 
level) we evaluated our research hypothesis. In our evaluation we distinguish post-
Bretton Woods era in the following sub-periods for the analysis of the Hellenic case 
using the Trilemma policy orientation as a criterion: 
 
First Sub-Period: 1971-1981 
 
The Trilemma configuration chosen by the Hellenic authorities is the following: 
(i) Exchange Rate Stability (ERS): crawling peg of the drachmae (GRD) or de 
facto peg with basket currencies in which the USD has the crucial role (quasi-
USD peg). Thus, relative ERS is valid. 
(ii) Monetary Policy Independence (MPI): for a small relative closed economy 
it is plausible to accept high MPI. 
(iii) Financial Integration (FI): the Bank of Greece (BoG) still uses capital 
controls (CC) continuing the Bretton Woods prediction. 
 
Hellas’ policy orientation may be described as “financially closed economy regime 
(FCER)”. Although the country has ratified an association agreement with the 
European Economic Community (EEC) since 1961, it is not a member yet. There are 
no significant international commitments in this era, nor is there external equilibrium 
while the government debt is not worth mentioning.  
 
Literature evidence on the effects of this Trilemma configuration is consistent with 
actual Hellenic economic performance at that time. More specifically, Hellenic 
FCER has been associated with lower domestic output volatility. 
 
Second Sub-Period: 1981-1994 
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Given that Hellas is now a full member of the European Economic Community 
(EEC), the Trilemma configuration chosen by the Hellenic authorities is the 
following: 
(i) Exchange Rate Stability (ERS): De facto crawling-peg of GRD with basket 
currencies in which the DEM has the crucial role (quasi-DEM peg). The 
growth rate of crawling is reduced after 1987 so as to not cover the inflation 
differential; efforts from the BoG for rising real competitiveness of the 
“infant” Hellenic industry. The commitments to European Monetary System 
(EMS) as a zone of relative ERS are the determinant of the relative policy. 
Thus, relative ERS is valid. 
(ii) Monetary Policy Independence (MPI): BoG still has relative MPI even 
less EMS than in the previous sub-period, given relative ERS and CC. 
(iii) Financial Integration (FI): the country still uses capital controls (CC) 
while based on EMS has been committed to open financial markets later than 
min-1990 as it was the case for the majority of EEC members. That was done 
in 1994. 
 
In Trilemma terms, during this period Hellas enjoys fewer “degrees of freedom” 
towards full ERS. Its policy orientation may be described as quasi-financially closed 
economy regime (quasi-FCER). As a full member of the EEC since 1981, the 
country has certain regional commitments. In the early 1980’s for the first time in a 
long time deficit appears in the balance of current accounts, while government debt 
started to grow, though still at low level as a ratio of the GDP. BoG issues the 
government debt in GRD under the Hellenic laws and controls the currency (GRD) 
of the debt.  
 
Literature evidence on the effects of this Trilemma configuration on macroeconomic 
performance is consistent with actual Hellenic economic performance at that time. 
Amongst others, it is valid that Hellenic even quasi-FCER has been associated with 
lower domestic output volatility. 
 
Third Sub-Period: 1994-2001 
 
The Trilemma configuration chosen by the Hellenic authorities is the following: 
(i) Exchange Rate Stability (ERS): De facto hard crawling-peg of GRD with 
basket currencies in which the DEM has the crucial role (quasi-DEM hard 
peg). The country implements the “convergence program” so as to fulfill the 
Maastricht criteria for entrance to the EMU. In February 1998 it enters the 
narrow band of ERM-II. Thus, ERS is almost valid. 
(ii) Monetary Policy Independence (MPI): BoG has very little MPI now, given 
almost ERS and free capital movement regime adopted from the beginning of 
the period.  
(iii) Financial Integration (FI): the free capital movement regime adopted from 
the beginning of the period. 
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In Trilemma terms, Hellas’ policy orientation may be described as quasi-monetary 
union or currency board (quasi-MU-CB). There are growing significant regional 
commitments (EU treaty, course towards EMU). The average debt during this period 
reached approximately 100% as ratio to the GDP, higher than the required 
Maastricht criteria, but in downward trend since 2002. BoG still issues the 
government debt in GRD, under the Hellenic laws, and relatively controls the 
currency (GRD) of the debt.  
 
Literature evidence on the effects of this Trilemma configuration on macroeconomic 
performance is consistent with actual Hellenic economic performance at that time. 
Amongst others, it is valid that quasi-MU-CB has been associated with higher 
inflation volatility and lower level of inflation. 
 
Fourth Sub-Period: 2001-2008 
 
The Trilemma configuration chosen by the Hellenic authorities is the following: 
(i) Exchange Rate Stability (ERS): with euro (€) as its national currency, ERS 
in the intra-EMU transactions is valid. 
(ii) Monetary Policy Independence (MPI): monetary policy is allocated to the 
ESCB-ECB. 
(iii) Financial Integration (FI): the free capital movement regime has already 
been adopted since 1994, the beginning of the previous sub-period. 
 
In Trilemma terms, the Hellenic economic policy configuration is the “monetary 
union (MU)”. There are strong regional commitments (EMU, SGP) considered with 
relatively lax attention by domestic authorities. In the late 1990s the debt was around 
100% as ratio to the GDP, higher than the required Maastricht criteria, but in 
downward trend (since 2002). BoG still issues the government debt in national 
currency, under the Hellenic laws, but the great difference is that it lost the 
opportunity to control the currency of the debt. Thus, the combination of the 
dynamics of expenditures for the Olympic Games in 2004 and excessive liquidity 
offered country’s during the integration into the EMU caused asymmetric excess 
domestic demand as opposed to its European major partners (first half of 2000s). 
ECB could not naturally support the small Hellenic economy, with its debt minimum 
in 2003 (97,4% as ratio of the GDP, lower even than that in 1994) and after 2005 
(peak) to follow a short period of downward trend till the 2008 crunch. However, 
policy makers did not consider the chronic competitiveness problems of the 
economy in times of euphoria of financial markets. 
 
The irony is that in the same period, wise leading economists suggested that the 
current account (CA) deficits would probably lead to dangerous accumulation in the 
government debt. According to them, Hellas should worry about its CA deficits and 
try to reduce it. EMU and its policy makers did not pay any attention to the 
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inconsistency in EMU’s original design and the need for regulation in financial 
markets. 
Literature evidence on the effects of this Trilemma configuration on macroeconomic 
performance is consistent with actual `Hellenic performance. Amongst others, it is 
valid that Hellenic performance ever since the country became a member of the 
EMU has been associated with higher output and inflation volatility. 
 
Fifth Sub-Period: 2008- 
 
The Trilemma configuration chosen by the Hellenic authorities is the same with that 
of the previous sub-period. 
 
As of 2008, the year the Global Minotaur collapsed, nothing has been the same in 
the rest of the world. For a small EMU-integrated country with almost no economic 
policy instruments to react to the global recession, like Hellas, this is even harsher. 
Domestic banking sector had not been exposed to CDOs or CDS, it was both local 
and regional integration that caused the enlarged debt crisis of 2009; domestic 
factors may be limited to “bad governance”, either in the sense that that politicians 
did not efficiently face chronic structural problems of the economy, or did not ahead 
of time ask for the implementation of EU Treaties, so as to prevent expansion of the 
crisis. Regional integration causes may refer to incomplete and non-optimal EMU. 
 
In May 2010 and in October 2011, Europeans leaders decided the establishment of 
institutions bearing an essence of “punishment” instead of correction of the EMU 
imperfections and in general creation of conditions stated under the OCA theory. 
The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF – ESM as of 2013 and on) and the 
Private Sector Involvement (PSI) mechanism, both associated with respective loan 
agreements (“memorandums”, legitimated by respective Hellenic laws) conditioned 
on unprecedented clauses for a European country. Its partners treated Hellas as a 
company as regards either the bonds collateral, or, under UK or Luxembourg law, 
wherever the loans required. Legal issues are beyond the limits of our analysis, 
however insofar as institutions affect the operational context of the economy, we 
should note that there is no precedent to sovereign bonds to be issued in foreign law, 
as happened here with the loan agreements between Hellas and European partners. 
As far as the restructuring of the public sector is concerned, its repayment in total 
was the only efficient way to overcome the country’s difficulties given the 
incomplete and non-optimal EMU and the lack of wisdom by local policy makers.  
 
Thus, downward trend in debt of 2005-2007 period reversed in 2008 to an increasing 
growth rate. Both rising yields of “zombie banks” coming out of the country and 
plunging into recession caused by austerity programs imposed by the government – 
Troika (EC, ECB, IMF) sharply increased the component “interest rate and GDP 
growth effects” of the debt’s growth. The opposite is true for the “primary budget 
effect” which in 2008 from 87,3% in 2008 dropped to 11,3% of the total growth of 
the debt in 2011. The depression that followed after the implementation of the 
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programs imposed by Troika proves that the latter failed in their fiscal consolidation 
goal. 
Literature evidence on the effects of this Trilemma configuration on macroeconomic 
performance is consistent with actual Hellenic performance. Amongst others, it is 
valid that Hellenic performance after the 2008 crunch and the ongoing crisis of deep 
recession has been associated with higher output and inflation volatility. 
 
We conclude by accepting our hypothesis, that is, inevitable debt crisis enforced by 
markets for Hellas suffering from bad domestic governance at the end of 2009. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Our approach in the present paper leads to the conclusion that there was no way but 
the debt crisis for a small financially integrated economy in a currency union 
suffering from bad domestic governance like Hellas. Furthermore, Hellas was not 
the origin of the ongoing European crisis and thus should not be treated as such by 
European leaders. The programs implemented so far have lead to a humanitarian 
crisis that needs to be resolved at least through “emergency state” legislation, giving 
priority to the standard of living of people against creditors of the country. Hellas 
could repay its debt through a logical and sustainable way by implementing clauses 
of development and trade as Germany did in the post-World War II period. 
Nevertheless, the solution can only be political starting, as a “Modest Proposal”, 
with the recognition that the Eurocrisis is threefold (a) investment crisis, (b) banking 
crisis and (c) sovereign crisis. 
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